The relation of weak and strong advocacy groups in big post-Soviet cities This paper considers the opportunities of urban local communities in St. Petersburg, Russia, to claim their right to the city under the conditions of aggressive urban (re)development initiated by strong advocacy groups. It questions whether and to what extent local communities conceptualize their demands to influence decision-making in urban planning and development as "political" and in doing so -acquire collective identity. It also describes the role of political opportunity structures in such conceptualization. Our final research question is whether the politicization of protest initiatives is an effective tool that local communities use to defend their neighborhoods against outer threats. In our research project, we have investigated ten cases of negotiations and conflicts between weak and strong advocacy groups around residential areas subjected to redevelopment, spot construction, demolition, etc., but in this paper we shall only focus on four cases to tackle various responses of the locals to unwanted urban change.
According to Boris Gladarev, "the individual activity [of the citizens] in the regime of planned action usually takes shape of thoroughly studying local and legal literature and sometimes develops into writing "letters to the state" that are sent to various public institutions or certain officials and other decision-makers personally. Let us concentrate on this practice because it is utterly widespread among the citizens despite its inefficiency. <…> Indeed, our empirical materials often show the political passivity of local communities' representatives who generally reproduce the pattern of soviet paternalism: they expect support and protection from high-ranking politicians, inconsistently react to top-town initiatives and do not interpret outer threats as "political", but rather understand them in terms of local demands.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the abovementioned researchers do not take into consideration the fact that in recent years the participants of local protest against city planning and development initiatives imposed by strong advocacy groups do not start with writing complaints but rather turn to available legal means of struggle over the contested territory by giving notices of claim to the court, sending requests to district administration and other institutions and finally attempting to establish self-government institutions at the local levelcondominium partnerships. It is only when their demands are not met in the course of legal strife that the citizens have to choose the most effective means of further struggle possible and decide whether to reproduce the traditional pattern of paternalism or follow the way of self-organization and eventually politicize their claims.
Politicization of local communities' activities in urban space contestation: theoretical framework
To comprehend the readiness of the city-dwellers to conceptualize their concerns and claims as political and test their opportunities to do so, we use the following theoretical frame.
First, we turn to the theory of political opportunity structure that reveals the features of political situation conditioning the opportunities and limitations of the protest initiatives of civic movements (Tilly 1978; Тarrow 1989; McAdam 1982; Lipsky 1968; Eisinger 1967 ). Second, we
use urban regime theory to analyze the coalitions of city authorities and big businesses aimed at the realization of city-planning decisions. Finally, we refer to the theory of action modality in crisis (Hirschman 1970) to describe the spectrum of local communities' responses to the (re)development initiatives threatening their urban spaces and the theory of collective rational action (Olson 1971) to discover the factors determining the strategies of the locals aimed at protecting their common good -the neighborhood.
According to Charles Tilly, political opportunity structure is the result of four interconnected processes that, being combined in different modes, dramatically change the opportunities of political protest. Those are the mechanism of public decision-making, economic and demographic changes and finally the cumulative history of tensions and conflicts that jointly determine the new repertoire of civic protest (Tilly 1995: 364) . Sidney Tarrow reduces the set of political opportunity structure characteristics to those parameters that can really serve as resources, i.e. can be used by social movements to achieve their goals and mobilize support (Tarrow 1989 ). Tarrow marks out three groups of political opportunity structure indicators which are the openness of political system, the stability of political forces alignment and the presence of influential allies that support the movement within the political system. Peter Eisinger (1973) contrasts "open" and "closed" structures of political opportunity depending on their accessibility.
Some political opportunity structure researchers summarize the differences in the extent of the institutional accessibility of political systems and distinguish between the so-called "strong" and "weak" states. Strong states are those where the access of citizens to institutional structures is strictly limited whereas government bodies in weak states are open for the citizens which reduces their opportunities to follow the chosen logic (Birnbaum 1985; Koopmans and Kriesi 1995) . Jon Elster adds that it is necessary to distinguish between the objective political opportunities of the actors and their beliefs because people sometimes do not even suspect they have resources or, on the contrary, overestimate their abilities (Elster 1989: 20) .
The Russian researchers of grassroots activities and urban movements in post-Soviet listed above generally tend to disregard the political opportunity structure including the interconnections of political structures, urban political regimes and the repertoires of protest instruments used by civic movements. They simply contrast the interests of the authorities and the population depicting the former as the sole decision-maker indifferent to the needs of the citizens and concentrated exclusively on profit-making.
Meanwhile, the exclusive opportunity of city authorities to distribute the resources of urban space does not necessarily mean that the administration can draw dividends from its usage single-handedly. C. Stone, the researcher of urban political regimes, argues that where local authorities have limited potential of deriving financial profits and independently solving city problems but are capable of fund raising (Stone 1988 ) coalitional political regimes are likely to emerge that combine the institutional resources of authorities and the investment guarantees of big businesses (Stone 1989) .
It is often assumed (Tev 2006 ) that in St. Petersburg the coalitions of authorities and big companies (in particular development corporations) can take shape of growth machines (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) aimed at the strategic economic development of the city.
According to Molotch, growth machines constitute the symbiosis of political and business elites that make mutual profits through effective use of urban territories and prompt decision-making followed by the rhetoric of "urban development" in public discourse (Logan and Molotch 1987 ).
However, the activities of growth machines rarely lead to the citizens' growth in prosperity:
"Economic development of cities is by no means identical with public benefits increase (Trubina 2011: 310). The strategies of growth machines designed to derive profits through investments in urban territories fully reflect the trends of late capitalism and neoliberal urban economy.
The political regime of growth machines that has developed in St. Petersburg reduces the possibilities of the citizens to contest urban spaces in court because adjudgements are often taken on the basis of existing ordinances signed by top officials of city administration: vice-governors, heads of committees and directly by the governor and therefore are subjected to the interests of these politicians and their allies.
Thus, representatives of local communities are forced to act under the conditions of legal uncertainty whereas city administration has the resources to arbitrarily grant or refuse the political rights of the citizens. The structural opportunities of the city-dwellers to realize and present their concerns and claims as political are therefore dramatically limited, which also restricts the possibilities for political maneuvers in urban space contestation.
If top-down decisions on urban development threaten the urban spaces identified as "theirs", the representatives of local communities consider the situation as crisis and implement various strategies of coping with the problem. In the terms of A.O. Hirschman's theory (Hirschman 1970) , these strategies fall under such "participation frames" as exit and voice. Exit means withdrawal from the unsatisfying situation or relationship by changing the delegate subject of decision-making whereas voice consists in declaring discontent in the face of the authorities, mass media, human rights activist organizations and broader publics. However, there exists also a popular "nonparticipation frame" -the option of loyalty that presupposes the citizens' passive acceptance of any top-down initiatives even if they lead to the deterioration of external conditions (Ibid).
The possibilities of citizens to exit vary depending on the type of contested space. If the representatives of local communities attempt to guard the territory of their yard or block against undesired urban development activities, they have an immediate opportunity to use exit modality by establishing self-government institutions at the local level -condominium partnerships. Such partnerships constitute an alternative to the state ownership of residential houses and adjacent grounds. However, if some public space such as an urban square or garden demands protection exit becomes utterly problematical if not impossible because local communities cannot choose the organizations responsible for managing the contested space. According to Hirschman, if exit is unachievable voice remains the only option capable of influencing the decisions of strong advocacy groups. Unlike Hirschman's approach, the theory developed by social economist Mancur Olson focuses on such dimensions of action as collectivity and the type of common good that the group struggles for. This is especially important for us since our subject of inquiry is a local community that always consists of several members promoting their shared interests. According to Olson, the interests of group members who plan to perform a collective action are based on their striving to benefit from the collective good and the ratio of efforts invested in the common cause.
Olson makes an important remark about the interrelation of collectivist and egoistical behavior patterns in a group as well as the stability of groups made up of members who prioritize individual goals over collective ones: if members of a large group rationally attempt to maximize their individual welfare, they make no efforts to achieve shared collective goals unless they experience external pressure or are offered personal motives for such action that do not coincide with the general interests of the group -the motives that can be implemented only provided that the members of the group take over some of the costs to achieve the common goal (Olson 1971: 4) . However, local communities, at least in the context of defending their "right to the city" 
Garage wars, 2009-2012
In 2009, a big construction company "Glavstroy St. Petersburg" grew interested in the territories of the industrial area "Parnas" where four garage cooperatives with the total number of approximately 8500 stalls were located. Fully ignoring the interests of weak advocacy groups, the authorities reconsidered the history of garage construction in the USSR, declared cooperative garages to be temporary constructions and confiscated the urban territories occupied by them for further usage by the investor company. The city administration offered to provide former garage owners with several spots to organize open air car parks -but all the necessary works had to be conducted at the expense of the aggrieved party. Each of the garage owners was expected to purchase a place in the parking that could cost several times higher than his/her vehicle.
Moreover, the authorities refused to pay any remuneration for the demolished garage stalls which certainly left the garage owners dissatisfied.
Some of the garage owners tried to use exit strategy through the privatization of the land parcels occupied by the stalls. However, this option that had been fully available just several years earlier got rapidly blocked by the authorities. Some owners also made efforts to quickly sell their garages thus attempting to realize an alternative strategy of exit. However, their desperate endeavors did not work because they failed to find the purchasers. Therefore, initiative garage owners had no choice but to act within protest mode in order to protect their stalls against demolition or assert their rights for compensation amounting to the market value of the garages.
The case of garage wars demonstrates the highest degree of politicization both in the local activists' claims and their means of struggle. For instance, the leaders of the initiative group fighting against garages demolition got to know each other not in the contested grounds of the cooperative parking lot "Parnas" but at the city-wide protest rally against the construction of the high-rise Okhta Center building and other urban planning problems. Simultaneously, this rally was directed against the political leaders associated with aggressive urban development such as the then Governor Valentina Matviyenko, President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Thus, urban public space turned into the arena for the consolidation of garage resistance movement. In the course of the rally, the decision was taken to establish a civic movement called "The Garage" which was later transformed into a politically active pressure group -the trade union of garage owners "Rubezh" that united several hundreds of citizens who suffered from the demolition. The poster says "Maize is no vegetable of ours!" 1 Therefore, already at the early stages of urban space contestation the leaders of garage cooperative defense embedded their direct local goals of demolition prevention in the city-wide 1 In informal discourses the high-rise building of Okhta Center was often compared to a maize cob.
context of struggle against high-rise construction, infill construction and for the satisfaction of the hoodwinked investors' requirements. It should be stressed that initiative garage owners saw the situation as directly dependent on the political will of city authorities and actively clamored against the head of the city and the major urban functionaries. For example, the leaders of the trade union tried to use political leverage in their struggle against the sitting Governor Valentina Matviyenko who was then going to take the position of the Federation Council speaker by putting forward their own candidate for municipal district deputy who could be regarded as Matviyenko's competitor. Simultaneously, the garage owners resorted to various spatial tactics: e.g. at nighttime they hung out a banner that depicted the Governor as a pig in a busy thoroughfare. One of the major means of struggle against the general political situation in the city which notably led to garages demolition not followed by any compensation were numerous Another striking demonstration of the leaders of "Rubezh" trade union to perceive their interests in garages protection as part of city-wide problems is their practice of networking both with other garage cooperatives members and with initiative groups designed to defend different types of urban space, e.g. the protectors of the public garden in Ivan Fomin street, or politically active organizations (anarchists, the Tigers 3 , etc.). These networks were used both for the exchange of experiences and ideas and for the organization of large-scale political protest.  Different political commitments of the protest movement leaders that were only temporarily united against the common challenge of their rights protection.
The contestation of Muzhestva Square
The struggle of the local community over Muzhestva Square located in urban periphery, Thus, the expectations of the local activists about their opportunities to participate in the debate on the fate of Muzhestva square did not correspond with the political opportunity structure that did not presuppose any partnership of the citizens and urban authorities. Meanwhile, the abilities of the citizens to voice discontent were also limited because protest activities for the defense of Muzhestva Square took place at the time where the practice of mass public rallies against incumbent authorities did not exist yet.
An important feature of Muzhestva Square contestation is that the local community had been self-organized even before this urban space was endangered: the community-based organization 
The defense of Yurgens' house
In 2010 the representatives of developer company "Co Ltd Luxor" bought all the apartments in Yurgens' house and planned to condemn the building which would have allowed the owner to demolish the building and construct a luxurious six-story business center instead of an old three-story house. located in the very center of Petersburg where, except for the rare cases of irreversible damage, the demolition of old buildings is prohibited. The type of contested space did not allow the city dwellers to resort to exit strategies and change the delegate subject of decision-making concerning the future of the house because they did not have any property rights to the building.
Members of the local community that protected Yurgens' house originally applied legitimate protest tools. They addressed various stakeholders such as the municipality, the management company, and city administration, wrote collective letters to the city Governor Valentina Matviyenko, and sent requests to the district administration. However, these actions proved themselves ineffective. This situation forced the local community members to fall back upon a political lobbyist -the deputy of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg, communist
Sergey Malkov -and start active long-term public protests within the regime of public justification.
Initially, the residents acted according to the logic of NIMBY movements (Hermansson 2007 ): they independently protested against the demolition of Yurgens' house and did not address other initiative groups or city-protecting movements. However, having soon received evidence that the legal contestation efforts were ineffective, the local activists opted for the strategy of consolidation with city-protecting movements such as "The Civil Initiatives
Movement" and "The Living City", "The Autonomous Action" and "The Organization for
Historic Buildings Conservation". In some cases, part of the local community even expressed willingness to shift responsibility for the struggle against demolition on "The Living City" -the most active civic movement designed to protect buildings recognized as cultural heritage.
However, these attempts aroused disapproval among the rest of the residents and the representatives of other initiative groups: In the course of protecting the building against demolition, the local activists also made aware of the need for networking with other initiative groups (the defenders of public garden in Fomin Street).
It should be noted that the legitimations produced by city-protecting movements and the representatives of the local community who struggled for the conservation of the endangered house in Zhukovsky Street differed significantly. In particular, the participants of "The Civil
Initiatives Movement" and "The Living City" movement rather referred to the historical value of the building subjectively significant for the city dwellers: "This is a low three-story building. (Olson 1971 ).
The coalition of Yurgens' house defenders embedded their problem in the context of other threats that aggressive urban (re)development generated in St. Petersburg. For example, the representatives of "The Living City" came to the meeting with posters containing information and visual material concerning the streets that were excluded from the security zones of the city and therefore found themselves at risk of demolition.
Therefore, it can be concluded that in the history of Yurgens' house contestation the apolitical, pragmatically oriented discourses of the local activists collided with the discourses of the city-protecting movements focused on city-wide urban planning and (re)development problems, gradually professionalizing their protest activities and often promoting the political methods of problems solution.
In the long run, the major efforts of struggle for the contested building were taken over by city-protecting organizations. They managed to attract the vice-governor' attention to the problem, and he suspended construction works threatening Yurgens' house. However, we have also discovered innumerous cases when local activists voiced their claims in political narratives and were fully aware of their right to the city to be political. These representatives of local communities tended to describe their problems and needs as structural rather than local; create networks that provided the possibility to share experience with and find support from other initiative groups; cooperate with city-protecting movements and sparse lobbyists in legislative bodies; participate in city-wide indignation meetings; and professionalize and politicize the discourse of local communities. 7 The head of administration, Central District, St. Petersburg. 8 The deputy head of administration, Central District, St. Petersburg.
The protection of Sergievskiy housing estate
The analysis shows that the availability of the legal problem-solution modes makes an important factor of the politicization of claims to contested urban spaces. Being able to legally exit from the unfavorable situation by changing the delegate subject of decision-making, local communities less likely present and promote their interests as political but rather place effort in the pragmatic achievement of their goals within the established institutional order (the defense of Sergievskiy housing estate). Meanwhile, when the possibilities of exit are blocked the citizens can dispute the decisions of strong advocacy groups only by voicing their discontent. However, even here the collision of two logics can happen when the attempts to place the local problems and challenges in the broader structural context of city-wide planning and (re)development issues contradicts the aspirations to pragmatically approach these local problems not going beyond NIMBY initiatives (the protection of Yurgens' house).
Not the least of the factors determining the degree of politicization characteristic for the local activists' claims and actions is also the availability of urban platform that turns into the arena of political discourses engaging broader publics. In such discourses, multiple local cases of struggle over urban space are interpreted as part of more general urban problems and the decisions of high-ranking political leaders both at the regional and federal level are seen as key reasons of conflict. When the defense of Muzhestva Square started, there was still no city-wide platform in St. Petersburg that could serve as a meeting place for diverse urban publics.
Nevertheless, the square itself successfully turned into the space that consolidated initiative groups from all city districts. Meanwhile, the conflict around garages demolition that flared up much later was from the very beginning introduced in more general oppositional discourse and presented in the context of a city-wide rally and therefore soon took a turn for full-scale politicization and institutionalization of protest. However, in both cases, references to values that were potentially relevant for general urban public constituted a powerful discursive trigger of such politicization.
As the empirical data show, the political opportunity structure that made the context of urban space contestation was not favorable for the attempts of local communities to voice their discontent and influence urban planning decision-making through political maneuvering. The communication between strong and weak advocacy groups was highly asymmetric and nontransparent and the attempts of the neighborhoods to promote more participatory approaches to tackling urban space were ignored. Local activists had to struggle for their right to the city under the conditions of legal uncertainty and arbitrariness of strong urban growth machines. The support they sometimes gained from political lobbyists was irregular and unreliable.
Nevertheless, with the development of tensions and conflicts history the local activists acquired more experience of political struggle and learned to share and augment this experience through networking. However, taking into consideration the recent trends of vertical power structure development in Russia that demand more repressive control over public sphere, the chances are high that local initiative groups will rarely resort to political instruments of urban space contestation and their discourses will become decreasingly politicized.
